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Abstract 
In this paper I seek to illuminate the obscure region within which other animals dwell in the 
philosophy of Judith Butler and, in so doing, demonstrate why the inclusion of nonhuman 
animals is fundamental to the ethical domain, as without it the normative privileging of the 
white Western heterosexual human male is inevitably reinforced. Through a critical 
engagement with Butler‘s work, it soon becomes clear that the constitution of the human 
subject in fact depends upon the inculcation of a normative network of ‗killing ideals‘ that 
excludes animals, women, and people of color. In contrast to Butler, however, I argue that 
‗the human‘ is never the simple effect of regulatory reproductive power, but rather that 
‗humanness‘ is itself a regulatory norm—a norm, moreover, through which all other norms 
must pass in order to reproduce themselves as ‗natural.‘ As a result, I argue, ethical 
responsibility demands that an ‗I‘ open its self to the risk of being judged socially non-viable 
and thus nonhuman. To respond ethically, in other words, necessarily entails the risk of 
becoming-unrecognisable within structures of meaning reproducing viable ways of being, as 
exemplified here by the life—and untimely death—of Venus Xtravaganza. 
 
Keywords: animals; performativity; nonhuman ethics; transgender sexuality; queer theory; 
intersectionality. 
 
Introduction: Crossing out the Animals 
In the film Paris is Burning (1990), director and producer Jennie Livingston vividly 
documents the Harlem drag balls between 1987 and 1989, in which African-American and 
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Latino men compete in a variety of categories such as ―executive,‖ ―schoolboy/girl,‖ and 
―town and country,‖ all of which are judged according to the single criterion of ―realness.‖ 
One of the balls‘ participants defines this as the attempt to become ―a real woman, or a real 
man – a straight man‖ – by ―erasing all the flaws, the mistakes.‖ ―Realness‖ in this context 
thus rests on an ability to ―pass‖ as ―the real thing,‖ that is, the ability to attain a certain 
believability through the reiteration of various social norms that together produce the effect of 
naturalness. At the same time, however, the very possibility of passing as real, that is, of 
artfully reconstituting an apparently natural effect, inevitably serves to denaturalize those 
very same norms which otherwise compel belief and thus apportion ―realness.‖ It is here, at 
this intersection of the natural and the unnatural, of the real and the artificial, that the figure 
of Venus Xtravaganza emerges as a compelling focal point of what is a problematic but 
nonetheless fascinating film.
1
 
A light-skinned Latina who ―passes‖ as both white and female, Venus desires above 
all a comfortable white domesticity. White girls, she says, get everything they want. For 
Venus, the only way of accessing this idealized domestic scene is by transforming herself 
into a ―complete‖ woman: ―I want a car, I want to be with the man I love, I want a nice home, 
away from New York where no one knows me [i.e., in middle-class white suburbia]. I want 
my sex-change. I want to get married in church in white.‖ It is not enough, in other words, for 
Venus to pass as white and female only at the Harlem balls. Rather, if this domestic ideal is to 
be realized, she must be able to pass all the time and in the most intimate of situations. This 
desire to be, and to desire the desires of, a wealthy white heterosexual woman is precisely the 
desire not to be excluded as foreign or unnatural. A passionate yet mundane desire that 
contrasts shockingly with the revelation of her murder as an addendum to the film.  
As a prostitute presumably killed by a male client upon discovery of her male sexual 
organs, Venus is thus murdered for her supplemental ―incompleteness,‖ for the foreignness 
that has always already invaded both the dream of the domestic and the domestic itself, the 
manifestation of which puts at risk her viability as a human being at the hands of a patriarchal 
order. Indeed, it is by no means incidental that her strangled body was eventually discovered 
stuffed under a bed – the place of an animal – in a cheap hotel room. Her murder thus all too 
clearly bears on the gap between the phantasmatic ―realness‖ performed during the balls, and 
the equally phantasmatic morphological ideal produced by the inculcation of hegemonic 
norms within society at large.  
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In order to better understand this process by which hegemonic norms either 
constitute, or refuse, a certain effect of ―realness,‖ the oeuvre of feminist philosopher Judith 
Butler is indispensible. Moreover, her core notion of performativity offers much for the 
emerging domain of Critical Animal Studies. Despite this, however, her work has been 
largely overlooked in this area – in the main, I believe, due to the erroneous belief that 
performativity refers only to human verbal language, leading many to dismiss it as some sort 
of linguistic constructionism which therefore ignores all ―natural‖ material and biological 
strata.
2
 Given that the opposite is in fact the case, I hope the following goes some way toward 
rectifying this error. 
Having said this, however, Butler‘s own ambivalence regarding the place, or 
otherwise, of nonhuman animals does not make this task any easier. The aim of this paper is 
thus twofold: first, to illuminate this obscure region in which other animals dwell within 
Butler‘s philosophy and, second, to thereafter further elucidate how the reproduction of 
―killing ideals‖ function to deny the humanness of Venus Xtravaganza and, in so doing, open 
the space for an apparently ―morally legitimate‖ putting to death. In this, we will also see 
why, in any critical engagement with the so-called ―question of the animal,‖ humanness too 
must be put into question, as only then does it become possible to understand how speciesism 
– marked fundamentally by the killing, rather than the murder, of nonhuman animals – forms 
the excluded support of myriad other structural exclusions, from racism and sexism to 
homophobia and classism.  
I begin by considering Butler‘s important early text Bodies That Matter (1993), in 
which she lays out her political philosophy of the performative. Therein, Butler argues that 
the apparently ―free‖ subject of secular humanism is rather the result of a regulatory network 
of inculcation which – by way of various ―phantasmatic‖ ideals that serve to exclude women, 
people of color, and the poor – thus ensures the continuing hegemonic privilege of the white 
―Western‖ heterosexual male. Butler‘s list of constitutive exclusions, however, is itself 
marked by exclusion, that is, by the exclusion of nonhuman animals. Indeed, this exclusion is 
made all the more ironic insofar as it is in large part thanks to the theoretical interventions of 
Butler, among others, that we now find ourselves in a position to recognize that the critical 
reinscription of nonhuman animals within those very places where admittance has thus far 
been refused is absolutely crucial if we are to transform the current regime of exploitation.
3
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To this end, I focus throughout on the contestation of one particular claim, initially 
proposed by Butler in Bodies That Matter and reiterated in a number of later texts: that the 
―human,‖ being neither substance nor specie, is simply the aggregate effect of regulatory 
reproductive power. Against this, I argue that ―the human‖ is never a cumulatory effect, but it 
is rather that ―humanness‖ is itself a regulatory norm constituted through species difference, 
just as ―whiteness,‖ for example, is a regulatory norm constituted through racial difference. 
―Humanness,‖ moreover, is a norm through which all other norms – of race, gender, class, 
sexuality, and so on – must pass in order to reproduce themselves as ―natural.‖ Think, for 
example, of the privileged sexuality accorded to the ideal of ―whiteness‖ so desired by Venus 
Xtravaganza, a privilege that can never be fully understood without recognising the 
concomitant displacement that shifts nonwhite sexuality toward ―animality.‖ Only then can 
we understand the fatal ―crossings‖ performed by Venus, and only with this understanding 
might we thenceforth begin to dismantle the racist, sexist, and speciesist network of privilege 
that resulted in her death. While a redress of this exclusion clearly points to the importance of 
thinking (with) animals for radical thought, it should also be noted from the outset that, in a 
very real sense, Butler herself calls for the clarifications contained herein, as we shall see 
when considering the ever-increasing ambivalence toward other animals that marks her later 
texts. As such, this paper is itself ambivalently positioned somewhere between critique and 
dutiful response. 
 
Phantasms, the Human-effect, and Ineffectual Animals 
 
To begin, it is necessary first of all to understand the process by which ―phantasmatic ideals,‖ 
imposed by the reiteration of regulatory norms, come to be naturalized. Take, for example, 
the activity of gendering. As Butler explains in Bodies That Matter, such an activity both 
precedes the willing subject of the secular humanist tradition, and is at once ―the matrix 
through which all willing first becomes possible‖ (1993: 7). Consider, she continues, the 
medical interpellation which – 
 
shifts an infant from an ―it‖ to a ―she‖ or a ―he,‖ and in that naming, the girl is 
―girled,‖ brought into the domain of language and kinship through the 
interpellation of gender. But that ―girling‖ of the girl does not end there; on the 
contrary, that founding interpellation is reiterated by various authorities and 
throughout various intervals of time to reinforce or contest this naturalized effect. 
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The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation 
of a norm (1993: 7-8). 
 
The subject, according to Butler, is the singular yet ventriloquized nexus of a network of such 
inculcations, constituted in the intersection of various phantasmatic ideals reproduced by 
regulatory norms with the result that the very materiality of the body ―will not be thinkable‖ 
apart from the materialization of these norms (1993: 2). Furthermore, each of these norms 
―require and deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulation‖ (1993: 18). Hence, 
the practice of gendering, to stay with Butler‘s example, requires that it simultaneously deploy 
racialising and heterosexualizing practices. Mutually supporting, there exist no independently 
articulated norms but only imbricated ―hegemonies of oppression‖ (1993: 132). As a result,  
 
[a] convergent set of historical formations of racialized gender, of gendered race, 
of the sexualization of racial ideals, or the racialization of gender norms, makes up 
both the social regulation of sexuality and its psychic articulations. … Hence, it is 
no longer possible to make sexual difference prior to racial difference or, for that 
matter, to make them into fully separable axes of social regulation and power 
(1993: 181-2). 
 
In short, reiterated practice is productive power: ―the power to produce – demarcate, circulate, 
differentiate – the bodies it controls‖ (1993: 1). It is this regulatory activity which, insofar as 
it both precedes and enables the materialization of the willing subject, leads Butler to claim 
that ―the matrix of gender relations is prior to the emergence of the ‗human‘‖ (1993: 7, 
emphasis added). The ―human,‖ by contrast, is merely the aggregate effect of regulatory 
reproductive power. It is here, however, that Butler‘s analysis loses its cohesion, in that such a 
claim actually effaces the relations of power it seeks otherwise to disclose. 
It is rather the case, as Butler in fact gestures toward in her discussion of Plato‘s 
khōra, that ―humanness‖ is itself a regulatory norm, a reiterated practice of human-ing which 
similarly requires and deploys every other norm for the purpose of its own articulation. Hence, 
equally important in the discussion of gendering activity is the imperative to also consider – 
and not as something external or separate – that ―other‖ matrix through which the majority of 
nonhuman animals are rather refused that shift to gendered being. Only once consideration is 
extended in this way does it become possible to understand the meshed machinery that opens 
the possibility of a refusal or withdrawal of gender, and which at the same time necessarily 
relegates the ―improperly‖ gendered human being to the status of an animal. Hence, only 
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when ―humanness‖ is understood as a regulatory norm imposing murderous, phantasmatic 
ideals through the mechanism of species difference can we understand the enactment of the 
specific withdrawal or withholding of recognition from Venus Xtravaganza, a withdrawal 
which ultimately serves to neutralize the subversiveness of her ―crossing.‖  
In practice, the naturalization of speciesism in Butler‘s text both traces and effaces an 
unmarked-but-marking receptacle through which all other norms must pass – an effacement 
that serves precisely to produce this apparent effect of ―the human.‖ This is not, however, to 
make species difference prior to, or more fundamental than, sexual, racial, or any other 
regulatory difference. Rather, as we shall see, species difference serves to ―ground‖ all the 
other norms at the same time as it is reciprocally ―grounded‖ by them. For this reason, it is 
necessary to extend Butler‘s convergent sets of historical formations beyond the imbrication 
of gender, sexuality, and race, so as to include such convergent sets as the animalization of 
racialized gender, the racialization of human norms, the normative sexualization of animality, 
and so on. Indeed, unless we attend to this imbrication of a speciesist reproduction of 
difference along and within racist, sexist, homophobic, and classist norms, those ―hegemonies 
of oppression‖ which critical discourse seeks to challenge may instead be unwittingly 
reenforced. 
While Butler does subsequently touch upon the mechanism of negative displacement 
whereby a targetted human or human grouping is ―relegated‖ to animal status, her repeated 
invocation of the human as an aggregate effect ensures that the economy undergirding this 
displacement remains frustratingly obscure. Thus in Precarious Life: The Powers of 
Mourning and Violence from 2004, Butler once again claims that ―there are racial and ethnic 
frames by which the recognizably human is currently constituted‖ (2006: 90, emphasis added), 
while simultaneously arguing that it is imperative that we ask how ―the human‖ works, ―what 
it forecloses, and what it sometimes opens up‖ (2006: 89). Indeed, on occasion Butler even 
refers to a ―norm of humanness‖ (2006: 98), acknowledging too that the reproduction of the 
―enemy‖ as ―less than human‖ involves ―a reduction of these human beings to animal status‖ 
(2006: 78). Butler, however, all too quickly glides over this issue, one result of which being 
that her analysis of the mechanism by which those illegally imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay 
come to be constituted as ―dangerous‖ remains – like her analysis of the murder of Venus 
Xtravaganza – necessarily incomplete.  
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Similarly, in her recent book Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (2009), Butler 
yet again writes of the ―the civilizational and racial norms by which the human is constituted‖ 
(2010: 93). Nevertheless, by now the specter of the excluded animal is increasingly making its 
(non)presence felt from within the margins of her discourse. Butler acknowledges, for 
example, that ―there is no firm way to distinguish in absolute terms the bios of the animal 
from the bios of the human animal‖ (2010: 19). This fundamental insight is immediately 
disqualified, however, insofar as Butler concludes from this only that ―animality‖ is therefore 
―a precondition of the human‖ (2010: 19). With this, she thus reinstitutes the very distinction 
just dismissed as untenable in that, given that the human has animality as its pre-condition, its 
animal status is therefore that which is transcended in becoming human, an event 
synonymous with the emergence of the human into the realm of pervasive social relations that 
form its actual, and thus exceptional, conditions. Put simply, Butler is here reiterating a 
central tenet of humanist dogma in claiming that the human comes to be only in transcending 
the state of (animal) nature.  
Ultimately, the vacillation between aggregate effect and constitutive norm reveals 
itself in the uncertainty with which Butler views her own theoretical position, as when she 
states in Precarious Life that ―I may seem to be positing a new basis for humanism. That 
might be true, but I am prone to consider this differently‖ (2006: 42). This hesitancy, put 
simply, can only be resolved by recognizing as fundamental the place and status of nonhuman 
animals. In order to fully appreciate the stakes involved, it is necessary to return once more to 
the founding principles as laid down in Bodies That Matter.  
To begin with, insofar as Butler refuses to think with nonhuman animals, she is thus 
compelled to invoke the empty yet foreclosed domain of ―the inhuman‖ as the constitutive 
outside of the human, an invocation that remains more or less constant throughout her work.
4
 
Instead of a simple and narcissistic reversal, however, it is rather the indecipherable 
nonhuman animal, traditionally synonymous with irrationality, with dumb nature, with the 
alogon, who haunts the boundaries of the properly human ―as the persistent possibility of 
their disruption and rearticulation‖ in both producing and threatening ―the more and the less 
‗human‘‖ (1993: 8). This latter, it is clear, requires some sort of continuum that the inhuman 
simply cannot provide. Indeed, particularly telling in this regard is Butler‘s later claim that 
once a body is produced as less than human, and is thus no longer apprehended as a ―life,‖ the 
murder of such a body can thereafter never take place (2006: 147). Put simply, killing ceases 
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to be murder only when the murder involves a ―mere‖ animal – the ―enemy‖ to be slaughtered 
may indeed be figured as ―inhuman,‖ but it is always as animals that they are killed. 
This becomes even clearer when we consider Butler‘s claim that ―the examples of 
those abjected beings who do not appear properly gendered‖ serve to demonstrate that ―it is 
their very humanness that comes into question‖ (1993: 8). This is indeed a crucial point. 
However, if the human is only ever the result or effect of the appellation and inculcation of 
gender and other norms, as Butler also claims, then an improperly gendered being (as cause) 
can never in fact result in the effect of humanness, meaning therefore that humanness can 
neither be questioned nor withdrawn, neither allocated nor retracted, degraded nor elevated, in 
that such a body can never have appeared human in the first place.  
Rather, it is only once we realize that ―humanness‖ is also a regulatory norm which, 
through the inculcation of viable ways of being, reproduces itself by way of the constitutive 
outside of ―the animal,‖ that the coincidence of improper gender and questionable humanity 
can be understood. Similarly, it is only by way of the constituted opposition between the 
human and the animal that we can understand, and thus question, the sexualization mutually 
articulated by the ―killing ideals‖ (1993: 125) of race, for example, as with the privileged 
sexuality accorded to the ideal of whiteness as noted above. 
In her introduction to Bodies That Matter, it might seem that Butler in fact pre-empts 
just this criticism when she states that ―any analysis which foregrounds one vector of power 
over another will doubtless become vulnerable to criticisms that it not only ignores or 
devalues the others, but that its own constructions depend on the exclusion of the others in 
order to proceed‖ (1993: 18). She then counters this future criticism with the point that ―any 
analysis which pretends to be able to encompass every vector of power runs the risk of a 
certain epistemological imperialism which consists in the presupposition that any given writer 
might fully stand for and explain the complexities of contemporary power. … [T]hose who 
claim to offer such pictures become suspect by virtue of that very claim‖ (1993: 18-19). Here, 
however, I make no such claims to certainty and/or completeness, but aim only to 
demonstrate that, if one wishes to even begin to approach the complexities of contemporary 
power, one cannot not include the question of speciesism, the inscription as excluded of 
nonhuman animals being necessarily indissociable from gendering, racialising, and 
sexualising activities. Indeed, Butler herself cannot continue without recourse to the animal, 
and it is this which raises the ambivalence that threatens to explode her discourse from within. 
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The animal, in other words, is essential to the hierarchical functioning of ―the more 
and the less,‖ in that ―the animal‖ is always the least of the less, the negative pole to be 
transcended – more and less – along a humanist teleology which reaches its apotheosis in the 
phantasmatic ideal of the white human male. Only once this is recognized does it then 
become possible to understand how the machinations of power legitimize the slaughter of 
human animals by way of the prior ―animalization‖ of a specifically targetted human or 
human grouping, a reconfiguration that strips its target of a fully human status and, in so 
doing, constitutes a non-subject that can thereafter be killed with impunity. One thinks here 
of the Nazi demonisation of Jews as Saujuden (―Jewish swine‖), or again of Lynndie England 
parading around Abu Ghraib with an Iraqi prisoner on a dog leash. Indeed, to reduce a 
singular, nonsubstitutable living being to an essential identity which is in turn reconfigured as 
―animal‖ is precisely the process that Butler describes as the reductive imposition of an 
unlivable identity.  
Ultimately, the complex differential articulation of regulatory norms necessarily 
constitutes women, people of colour, lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, the poor, and so 
forth, as ―more‖ and ―less‖ human, and thus at once as ―more‖ and ―less‖ animal. The 
naturalization of heterosexuality, for example, depends upon the normative sexualization of 
animality (paradoxically utilising an unremarked biological continuism). Or again, the 
alleged misandry of the lesbian – in which ―a lesbian is one who must have had a bad 
experience with men, or who has not yet found the right one‖ (1993: 127) – crosses with the 
alleged misanthropy attributed to anyone concerned with the exploitation, torture and 
extermination of nonhuman animals (animal activists, it is invariably alleged, must hate 
humans as a result of social deficiency). Following Butler, such diagnoses presume, on the 
one hand, that lesbianism ―is acquired by virtue of some failure in the heterosexual 
machinery, thereby continuing to install heterosexuality as the ‗cause‘ of lesbian desire‖ 
(1993: 127) and, on the other, that animal concern is acquired by virtue of some failure in the 
machinery of anthropocentrism, thereby continuing to install human exceptionalism as the 
―cause‖ of animal concern. One thinks here, for example, of love for a nonhuman companion 
animal being reconstrued as deflected desire for a (human) child.  
In this way, both humanist and heterosexual desire are thus always constructed as 
―true,‖ whereas animal concern and lesbianism are ―always and only a mask and forever 
false‖ (1993: 127). Within this economy too is found the reactive subordination in which 
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concern for nonhuman suffering is deemed offensive to man – as degrading to both his 
exceptionality and his interiority – and dismissed as an immoral deflection of ―more 
pressing‖ human concerns. Here then, one can clearly perceive the importance of critical 
animal studies in that, by way of its central notion of intersectionality, it thus seeks to 
challenge the ―hegemonies of oppression‖ in all of its articulations. 
We should not be surprised, therefore, that in Butler‘s text the displacement and 
denigration of species difference to that of a mere ―effect‖ has serious consequences – as 
acknowledged by Butler herself, albeit only negatively in the context of sexual difference. It 
is the claim of a fundamental priority for sexual difference over racial difference which, she 
writes, 
 
has marked so much psychoanalytic feminism as white, for the assumption here is 
not only that sexual difference is more fundamental, but that there is a relationship 
called ―sexual difference‖ that is itself unmarked by race. That whiteness is not 
understood by such a perspective as a racial category is clear; it is yet another 
power that need not speak its name. Hence, to claim that sexual difference is more 
fundamental than racial difference is effectively to assume that sexual difference 
is white sexual difference, and that whiteness is not a form of racial difference 
(1993: 181-2, emphasis added). 
 
In the same way therefore, to claim an equal and fundamental primacy of human differences 
presupposes that the relationships named in this way are themselves unmarked by species, 
thus effectively assuming that sexual and racial differences are human sexual and racial 
differences, and that humanness is not a form of species difference. It is to assume, in other 
words, that the constitution of ―the more or the less‖ human (and simultaneously of ―the more 
or the less‖ animal) is itself unmarked by racial and sexual differences. In short, the humanist 
ideals of the ―West‖ are assumed to be prior to, and thus untouched by, racial, sexual, and 
species differences – an assumption which, as we will see in the next part, thus reiterates the 
Platonic economy of xenophobic masculinist reason. We can also see that Butler‘s attempt to 
preempt criticism by way of the impossibility of completeness does not, by virtue of her own 
logic, apply here. 
 
The Foreign in Place and the Madness of Power 
The stakes of this exclusive operation are disclosed most clearly by Butler herself in her 
critique of Luce Irigaray‘s reading of the khōra in Plato‘s Timaeus (not by chance the only 
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place in Bodies That Matter where, to my knowledge, Butler attends – if only briefly – to 
nonhuman others). Whereas Irigaray identifies the ―elsewhere‖ of the khōra with the 
founding exclusion of the feminine, Butler points out that Irigaray must therefore exclude all 
those ―other‖ others similarly excluded from the economy of masculinist reason: 
 
Plato‘s scenography of intelligibility depends on the exclusion of women, slaves, 
children, and animals, where slaves are characterized as those who do not speak 
his language, and who, in not speaking his language, are considered diminished in 
their capacity for reason. … This domain of the less than rational human bounds 
the figure of human reason, producing that ―man‖ as one who is without a 
childhood; is not a primate and so is relieved of the necessity of eating, 
defecating, living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always a property holder; 
one whose language remains originary and untranslatable (1993: 48). 
 
For Plato, as Butler makes clear, it is the speechless – and thus irrational – being who must be 
excluded in crafting the ―imaginary morphology‖ of masculinist reason. In this, the dumb 
animal – embodied, enslaved, and without property – is thus the utterly other, the absolute 
outsider. The spectre, in other words, of an indecipherable and unmasterable materiality, a 
dreadful eating, dying, living, and defecating unintelligibility. Terrifying, monstrous, ―the 
animal‖ never stands before ―the human‖ in the relation of a simple reversal of intelligibility 
(i.e., as the inhuman), but rather marks its very limit and, as such, constitutes the site of a 
terrifying potential identity which, in being imposed, ultimately renders the Other both 
indecipherable (and thus outside of ―civilized‖ sociality) and monstrous (and thus outside of 
―the human‖).  
In this way, the undecidable limit that is ―the animal‖ falls back upon those ―other‖ 
human animals, an economy indissociable from the constitution of the property of the liberal 
humanist subject. Thus, while Butler points out that the ―materialization of reason … 
operates through the dematerialization of other bodies,‖ the feminine being that which is 
itself undifferentiated but which contributes to the contouring of things (1993: 49), the figure 
of the abject nonsubject without which this dematerialization could not be reproduced rather 
remains always that of ―the animal‖ as undifferentiated Nature. It is this, moreover, which 
always again reserves the potential to animalize ―other‖ humans and thus render them killable 
or, in Butler‘s terms, nonliving and thus non-grievable.  
Here, it is essential to attend to the crucial distinction between the two teleological 
determinations that figure the dominant metaphysical forms of the human-animal relation.
5
 In 
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the first, the production of the human is based upon the death or nonexistence of the animal – 
the human, in other words, begins where the animal ends. In the second, the human remains 
in a constant struggle with his or her own animality which must be repeatedly overcome in 
being-human. Both of these determinations, it should be noted right away, thus fallaciously 
define the nonhuman animal only by what he or she lacks within a dialectic that therefore 
marks every nonhuman animal as sub-human – a dialectic which, as we have already seen, 
Butler reiterates insofar as she makes animality a precondition of humanity. This has 
extremely serious implications, insofar as it is a production which simultaneously serves to 
ground, in its appeal to an evolutionary tēlos, the reconfiguration of ―other‖ humans as 
irrational, that is, as subhuman animals – be they primitives, idiots, or lunatics – in opposition 
to normative speciesist rationality. 
This mention of primitive idiocy or subhuman lunacy thus brings us into the vicinity, 
the proximity, of madness, and here too we share our concerns with Butler. However, it is the 
animal, even more than the idiot (with whom the animal nonetheless retains an intimate 
relation), who points to a privative relation to language. In her examination of stupidity, 
philosopher Avital Ronell describes the idiot as a being who ―unleash[es] only muffled 
signals of original erasure‖ (2003: 253). Yet, there can be no idiot without the animal who, 
with her alleged lack of language and thus ontological memory disorder, is the most idiotic of 
idiots, the constitutive outside of reason and thus also of idiocy – the idiot representing a 
deprived relation to language, rather than a deprivation of language. Hence, it is not idiocy, as 
Ronell contends, but rather the animal who fallaciously ―commences in disfigurement, as the 
mutilation over which the philosophers tried to write in an attempt to restore the proper, the 
literal, what is proper to man‖ (2003: 253). The notion of idiocy, of the subnormal or 
subhuman, thus employs regulatory norms constituted through species difference in ways that 
mutually articulate other regulatory norms such as ―whiteness‖ and ―maleness.‖ Think, for 
example, of the institution of racialized Intelligence Quotient tests as a method of regulating 
immigration into the US, the application of which being so designed as to ensure that a high 
percentage of nonwhite, non-European applicants would register at the ―moron,‖ ―imbecile,‖ 
or ―idiot‖ levels – categories in turn overdetermined with notions of overt and perverse 
sexualization, including incest and bestiality, resulting from an alleged animal primitiveness 
that supposedly leaves people of color at the mercy of their ―uncivilized‖ drives.6 
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Outside, yet undecidably so, of the exclusive property of the human, the absolute 
idiocy of the instinct-driven animal – the irrationality of the beast – thus relates at once to the 
domain of the domestic, to ―animal‖ reproduction and to the foreigner who contaminates that 
properly civilized domesticity. The xenophobic Platonic exclusion, writes Butler, operates 
through the reproduction of ―those considered less rational by virtue of their appointed task in 
the process of laboring to reproduce the conditions of private life‖ (1993: 49). Here, Butler 
thus draws attention to the animalization of both reproductive and domestic labour. In the 
former category, we find the exclusion from masculinist reason of women thus confined 
within the domain of the domestic figured by the ―animality‖ of reproduction. In the latter, 
masculinist reason excludes all those other beings who, outside within the domestic, are thus 
construed as foreign to reason, i.e., slaves, immigrant workers, and children, as well as 
certain other so-called ―food‖ and ―working‖ animals. Labouring only to reproduce the same 
of masculinist reason – albeit without leaving their mark – , the twinned categories of the 
domestic and the domesticated are thus, by way of nonhuman animals, constituted as that 
which improperly and unintelligibly reside within the domain of the properly human 
precisely as the condition of its reproduction. 
As we have seen, the unintelligible animal marks the constitutive outside of the 
human norm, and thus the site of an identification which, when externally imposed, is always 
to be dreaded.
7
 At the same time, however, the animal must remain within the properly 
human as the trace of ―its‖ denial. Animals remain, in other words, as the foreign residing 
within human property, inscribed as excluded within the uniform and calculable reproduction 
of the Same. Already within the domestic scene through which the human is reproduced, 
―man‖ has no choice but to share his home, his place, with ―the animal‖ and, indeed, with 
other animals. Exceeding all recognition and yet sharing our space and taking our time, 
animals are thus the most distant in the closest proximity: the always with us that are not 
―us.‖  
It is for this reason that the question of ethics must begin with nonhuman animals. In 
part, I would suggest, Butler is ultimately unable to fully articulate the normative mechanism 
of exclusion as a result of the influence of Emmanuel Levinas‘s ethical humanist philosophy 
on her own thought subsequent to Bodies That Matter.
8
 The problem, as I see it, rests with the 
fact that Levinas limits his thought to the two poles of humanization and dehumanization, 
when it is only by admitting the ―animal‖ that critical thinking stands a chance to interrupt the 
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process by which life is withdrawn from the living. It is here, in this indecipherable domain, 
where we will discover those beings to whom, and perhaps first of all, we owe a 
responsibility and a response to the shared precarity that marks the community of the living 
in general. It is, in short, to affirm our being-together outside of any exclusive hierarchy by 
which the value of other beings is unthinkingly rejected and abjected, and thus to resist as far 
as possible the imposed violence of the subject-formation that necessarily precedes every ―I.‖ 
By contrast, an ethics which presupposes ―the human‖ as at once its condition, effect, and 
unmarked category is an error which in practice ensures that ethics can never begin.  
 
 
Crossing out the human: Venus, the slaughter of an animal body 
 
Having understood the necessity of ―admitting‖ other animals within the ethical domain, we 
are now in a position to reconsider the mechanism through which the death of Venus 
Xtravaganza is articulated. 
In essence, the murder of Venus Xtravanganza offers to view a ―limit case‖ of the 
human and, in so doing, renders perceptible the otherwise habitual hegemonic operation of 
normative frames. As Butler writes, this is a ―killing that is performed by a symbolic that 
would eradicate those phenomena that require an opening up of the possibilities for the 
resignification of sex‖ (1993: 131). Nevertheless, it is never only a question of sexuality: 
 
If Venus wants to become a woman, and cannot overcome being a Latina, then 
Venus is treated by the symbolic in precisely the ways in which women of color 
are treated. Her death thus testifies to a tragic misreading of the social map of 
power, a misreading orchestrated by that very map according to which the sites 
for a phantasmatic self-overcoming are constantly resolved into disappointment. If 
the signifiers of whiteness and femaleness – as well as some forms of hegemonic 
maleness constructed through class privilege – are sites of phantasmatic promise, 
then it is clear that women of color and lesbians are not only everywhere excluded 
from this scene, but constitute a site of identification that is consistently refused 
and abjected in the collective phantasmatic pursuit of a transubstantiation into 
various forms of drag, transsexualism, and uncritical miming of the hegemonic 
(1993: 131). 
 
For the reasons already discussed, Butler thus leaves unmarked the question of what 
constitutes viable ways of being human. However, given the mutual articulation of regulatory 
norms, the de-naturalization of both race and gender enacted by Venus must at once de-
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naturalize the constructed domain of the properly human. Paradoxically, Venus here falls prey 
to the murderous judgment, both homophobic and misogynistic, of ―unnaturalness‖ (of being 
a ―freak of nature‖), which thus falls back upon an unremarked biological continuism. As we 
know, the naturalization of human heterosexuality depends upon the normative sexualization 
of animality (long used by men to excuse anything from rape to hunting), hence the exclusion 
of homosexuality from the activity of ―human-ing‖ moves by way of a constructed 
―unnaturalness‖ that depends upon an apparently ―natural‖ human animality or, rather, upon 
the reproduction of sexual activity as essentially animal, and thus in a sense not ―human‖ at 
all.  
The reproduction of Venus as ―unnatural,‖ in other words, paradoxically depends 
upon her exceptional humanness so as to withdraw from her that very status of ―humanness.‖ 
At the same time, however, the conservative judgment which ends with her murder-slaughter 
depends equally upon a human-animal distinction which denies to humans another putatively 
―natural‖ animal sexual and reproductive activity, that of the potential retained by certain 
nonhuman animals to change their ―biological‖ sexuality so as to gain social advantage. In 
this way, Venus Xtravanganza finds herself doubly displaced between the ―naturalness‖ and 
the exceptionalism of ―the human.‖ 
Venus is thus murdered for both her unnaturalness and her animality, an ―unnatural 
animality‖ which fatally crosses with white, masculinist notions of her being a prostitute and 
both (and neither) a Latina and a woman. In potentially putting into question what it means to 
be properly human and, consequently, properly animal, Venus – described by her House 
mother as being too wild, as always taking too many risks – thus at once risks performing an 
abject and ―unnatural animality‖ which, displacing her inside the ―outside‖ of the human 
domain, withdraws from her all human rights and protections. As Butler writes, 
 
The painfulness of her death at the end of the film suggests as well that there are 
cruel and fatal social constraints on denaturalization. As much as she crosses 
gender, sexuality, and race performatively, the hegemony that reinscribes the 
privileges of normative femininity and whiteness wields the final power to 
renaturalize Venus‘s body and cross out that prior crossing, an erasure that is her 
death (1993: 133). 
 
Such a displacing renaturalization, however, one which moves Venus from unequal sexual 
partner to dead animal stuffed under a bed, cannot be performed by the constituted abjection 
Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume 10, Issue 4, 2012 (ISSN1948-352X) 
 
 
35 
 
of race and sexuality alone. Rather, its ―crossing-out of the crossing‖ must simultaneously 
cross, must pass through and cross out, the nonhuman animal.  
 
 
Becoming-unrecognisable: challenging frames 
 
Insofar as the various regulatory norms all deploy each other for the purpose of their own 
articulations, putting ―humanness‖ into question necesarily poses a challenge to the entire 
network of hegemonic oppression – a question which is nothing less than the question of 
recognition. However, in thus exposing one‘s being to the unintelligible outside in such a way 
as to interrupt the conservative machinery of recognition, in that very same moment the body 
necessarily undergoes the profound risk of becoming unrecognizable. To affirm one‘s kinship 
with that which hegemonic norms habitually foreclose is, in other words, to risk the 
withdrawal not only of a viable subject status, but also the withdrawal of one‘s race or gender, 
one‘s class or sexuality, even one‘s membership of a species – a withdrawal that marks the 
effective neutralization of any such ―crossing‖ within and by a given state of affairs. 
Regulatory practices, in that they are necessarily aimed both at everyone and to no 
one (there being no preexisting subject of will), are thus general, structural, and therefore 
recurrent, requiring endless reiteration in order to naturalize their power and efficacy. Yet that 
which guarantees the ongoing efficacy of such regulation – that is, the recontextualization that 
defines its practice – is also that which already undermines it, insofar as the very excess of 
this iterability ensures that the context of an utterance is never fully determined. Put simply, 
every reiteration of a norm, in being repeatedly forced to function in a different context, 
inevitably brings with it the risk of misinterpretation and revaluation resulting in an 
―improper‖ inscription. This risk, moreover, is further compounded by its mutual deployment 
of other norms, which always presupposes the possibility of a radical interference. It is this 
structural excess which thus opens up the possibility of challenging the normative framework 
insofar as its reproduction always runs the risk of a violent, unforeseeable transformation.  
In being always subject to recognition, therefore, the singularity of any given 
interpellation necessarily retains the potential to put to work otherwise the machinery of 
materiality, violating the proper limit of identification and opening instead the ethical space 
called for by an encounter that challenges the frames of recognizability. Such then, is the site 
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of the bodying of Venus Xtravaganza, a ―limit case‖ that allows us to recognize and thus 
move beyond the nomative framework insofar as she denaturalizes the founding-conserving 
network of regulatory norms. As such, however, the already existing state of affairs is for the 
same reason compelled to seek its neutralization – a neutralization that always involves the 
refusal or withdrawal of the rights and protections of personhood.  
Hence, in placing oneself outside of a given state of affairs, one simultaneously 
places one‘s self at risk. As Butler says in her reading of Michel Foucault from Giving an 
Account of Oneself, 
 
To call into question a regime of truth, where that regime of truth governs 
subjectivation, is to call into question the truth of myself … [It also] involves 
putting oneself at risk, imperiling the very possibility of being recognized by 
others, since to question the norms of recognition that govern what I might be, to 
ask what they leave out, what they might be compelled to accommodate, is, in 
relation to the present regime, to risk unrecognizability as a subject or at least to 
become an occasion for posing the questions of who one is (or can be) and 
whether or not one is recognizable (2005: 22-3). 
This risk, moreover, not only concerns the refusal or withdrawal of recognition by society at 
large, but it is also to risk becoming unrecognizable to oneself. At its extreme, one finds 
oneself incapable of continuing to exist and thus risks falling prey to enforced cessation, be it 
suicidal or murderous. Being responsible, argues Butler, is to open oneself to this risk. Indeed, 
this is precisely what it means to respond. 
Following Butler then, the ethical imperative concerns those unrecognizable others 
who already take place within our most intimate property and to whom we must respond no 
matter the risk to our selves. In contrast to Butler‘s position, however, such an imperative 
must remain excessively and vigilantly nonhuman, as a brief consideration of the concluding 
paragraph of Butler‘s Giving an Account of Oneself makes clear. Here, Butler offers an 
important and succinct description of the ethical imperative. Ethics, she writes, 
 
requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness … To be 
undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance 
– to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be 
prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient 
―I‖ as a kind of possession. If we speak and try to give an account from this place, 
we will not be irresponsible, or, if we are, we will surely be forgiven (2005: 136).  
 
The problem, however, lies hidden behind that innocent-looking ellipsis in the first line, 
wherein Butler qualifies that such risky moments – moments ―when what forms us diverges 
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from what lies before us‖ – are specifically those moments ―when our willingness to become 
undone in relation to others constitutes our chance of becoming human‖ (2005: 136, emphasis 
added). Such encounters, in short, are the proper and the property of human animals alone. 
However, if the human is simply a cumulative effect of intersecting praxes of power, as Butler 
contends, how then can ethics be restricted to the level of effect? Rather, I argue, ―the human‖ 
is precisely what the ethical encounter tears apart. 
In fact, Butler here opens herself to the very same critique which, as mentioned 
above, she levels at Luce Irigaray in Bodies That Matter. Irigaray, we recall, idealizes and 
apropriates ―the ‗elsewhere‘ as the feminine,‖ and in so doing ―fails to follow through the 
metonymic link between women and these other Others‖ (1993: 49). Here then, the question 
Butler poses to Irigaray must in turn be posed to Butler herself: what or who is the 
―elsewhere‖ of Butler‘s ―elsewhere‖? What or who is excluded in the course of Butler 
analysis? Given her idealization and appropriation of the ―elsewhere‖ that are ―moments of 
unknowingness‖ as the uniquely human, the answer is all too obvious. But in what sense, it 
must be asked, can a properly human ethics authentically constitute an ethics of the 
unrecognisable other, that is, an address that risks forming and transforming an ―I‖ outside of 
all dominant structures of meaning?  
If ethics is the becoming of the human, then the human is simply an animal + ethics, 
whereas ―other‖ animals are therefore pure or simple being without supplement – 
ontologically deprived of ethics and thus essentially outside of the ethical domain. In this, 
Butler simply repeats Emmanuel Levinas‘s very traditional claim that the ―ethical 
peculiarities‖ that determine the humanity of man constitute ―a rupture of being‖ – that is to 
say, that only the human animal can be ethical because only the human breaks with the pure 
animal being of instinctive self-preservation (Levinas, cit. Butler 2006: 132). Here, Butler is 
once again arguing that ―the human‖ comes to be only in dialectically overcoming and thus 
ceasing to be an animal, that is, in transcending its animal precondition, in what is a variant of 
the all too familiar, all too human ascension from ―base nature‖ to ―higher culture.‖ As such, 
rather than positing a ―new basis‖ of humanism, she is in fact instaurating a very old one 
indeed. 
In summary, Butler impels us to recognize ethics as risking ―our‖ selves in a moment 
of unknowingness and undoing that puts into question the norms of recognition. 
Simultaneously, however, she reproduces perhaps the most proper of recognisable norms: that 
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of ethics, and thus the capacity to respond, as the limit and the proper of the human. Indeed, it 
is as an inevitable result of refusing to admit animals into one‘s self or one‘s philosophy that 
Butler remains helpless but to reinscribe the unrecognisable call and indecipherable demand 
of the other within the domain of the properly – similarly, familiarly – narcissistic.  
Only once we break with the limitations that impose themselves on Butler‘s notion of 
a precarity and a grievability that is shared among the living in general can the norms that 
reproduce other lives as nonliving thenceforth be effectively challenged – only then might we 
recognize that killing an animal is murder, and only then might Venus Xtravaganza have 
survived her crossing. If, however, we instead continue to exclude the animal, then the only 
traces left by a seemingly infinite number of other animals – both human and nonhuman – 
will be the mark, unremarked and unmourned, of their erasure. 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
With grateful acknowledgment to Dr. Jennifer Bajorek and to the anonymous reviewers at 
JCAS for the clarifications they offered. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. On the problems of Livingstone‘s ―phallic‖ position of promise behind the camera see bell 
hooks ―Is Paris Burning?‖ Z, Sisters of the Yam (June 1991), which in turn is further 
discussed by Butler in Bodies That Matter, pp.133-7. 
2. There are, to my knowledge, a couple of notable exceptions: Kelly Oliver‘s Animal 
Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009), which briefly deals with Butler‘s work in relation to nonhuman animals; and 
Chloe Taylor‘s ―The Precarious Lives of Animals: Butler, Coetzee, and Animal 
Ethics‖ in Philosophy Today (2008), 52, pp.60-72 (I thank the anonymous reviewer at 
JCAS for drawing my attention to this latter paper). 
3. On the explosive transformative potential that resides in such a reinscription, see Andrew 
Benjamin Of Jews and Animals (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p.19. 
4. Subsequent to Precarious Life, in Giving an Account of Oneself (2005) Butler fleshes out – 
so to speak – the concept of ―the inhuman‖ to some degree through an engagement 
with Theodor Adorno. Nonetheless, it remains conveniently empty of specific content 
and thus open to the mutiple valences Butler finds in Adorno – an emptiness which in 
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turn reveals the violence undergirding its instrumentalized relation. In Frames of War, 
Butler again maintains that the inhuman functions as the constitutive outside through 
which the human, understood as both value and morphology, may be both ―allocated 
and retracted‖ (2010: 76). 
5. On this, see Benjamin‘s Of Jews and Animals, pp.113-118. 
6. On this, see Stephen J. Gould The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981). 
7. In the Republic, for example, Plato claims that the ―despised‖ manual workers are ―apes‖ 
insofar as they are naturally weak in reason and thus condemned to serve their most 
base and beastly instincts (590a-591c). Interestingly, according to Plato the biggest 
threat to the security of his plutocratic Republic is the emergence into the polis of the 
―instinct‖ or ―urge‖ for democracy that is naturally shared by all those foreign to 
reason, the most dangerous symptom of which is a ―sensitivity‖ toward the 
enslavement and exploitation of other animals. On this, see my paper ―Cannibals and 
Apes: Revolution in the Republic,‖ which can be accessed at: 
http://zoogenesis.wordpress.com/2012/07/03/cannibals-and-apes-revolution-in-the-
republic/ 
8. Levinas‘s ethical philosophy of the ―face‖ is considered in detail in the concluding part of 
Giving an Account; in the concluding essay of Precarious Life; and again in the 
concluding essay entitled ―The Claim of Non-Violence‖ in Frames of War. Moreover, 
immediately following Butler‘s analysis of the human as a ―shifting prerogative‖ in 
the long essay ―Torture and the Ethics of Photography‖ in Frames of War, Levinas‘s 
notion of the face is yet again invoked. 
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